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THE TOOTHLESS CONVENTION: THE LACK OF POLITICAL
WILL TO UPDATE THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
Olivia Bauer

Real World Observation
On September 10, 2014, The New York Times reported a stabbing that took
place in the airport in Lagos, Nigeria. The article continues to say that a federal
air marshal was stabbed with a syringe, “an incident that is raising concerns
about whether the deadly Ebola virus could be harvested from the widespread
outbreak in West Africa and used as a bioweapon.”1 The initial tests done on
the contents of the syringe do not detect Ebola or any other dangerous bio
logical agent, and the air marshal was examined and released from a hospital
in Houston with no sign of sickness. While “experts say it would be extremely
hard for a group to grow large amounts of the virus and turn it into a weapon
that could be dispersed over a wide area, [...] it is harder to completely discount

1
Andrew Pollack. “Stabbing With Syringe in Nigeria Raises Concerns of Ebola as Weapon,”
The New York Times, September 10 2014 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/11/world/africa/
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the possibility of a smaller attack.”2 Ebola is not a particularly contagious virus,
but it is has a high mortality rate once contracted. Its fatality is clearly seen
in the most heavily affected areas of the Ebola outbreak. As of September 25,
2014 “at least 2,909 people have died in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, with
6,242 reported Ebola cases over all, according to the latest report of the United
Nations’ health body. Nigeria and Senegal have recorded a total of eight deaths
and 21 cases of infection.”3 The United States government has responded quite
dramatically to the Ebola outbreak in Africa with an unprecedented commit
ment of military forces. Dan Lamothe with The Washington Post reported that
President Obama “framed the ongoing Ebola epidemic in western Africa as a
potential threat to global security, a two-star Army general and his staff were
already on the ground in Liberia, preparing for a mission that is expected to
include about 3,000 service members and has no end in sight.”4 While the reac
tion on the part of the United States is unprecedented, the threat of biological
agents and their potential use as biological weapons has existed for some time.
In recent years, biological agents have been assessed with increasing fre
quency as having a dangerous and pressing potential for use as weapons. A
recent example occurred in April of 2013, when The New York Times reported,
“a letter sent to a U.S. Senator from Mississippi tested positive for the poison
ricin.”5 While the letters were successfully intercepted and analyzed, the exis
tence of an attack like this one serves to show the progress that still needs to
be made in eliminating the potential for biological agents to be used against
citizens, and even states. These domestic attacks are only evidence of the terrify
ing possibility of an interstate biological weapons attack. Historically, when it
became clear that biological weapons were a threat to state actors, the Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC) was written and signed in 1972. In 1975, the
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United States ratified the BWC, and today, there are 165 signatory states. The
State Department defines “the BWC [as being] critical to international efforts
to address the threat posed by biological weapons—whether in the hands of
governments or non-state actors—and to remain effective it must continue
to adapt to the wider range of biological threats we face in the 21st century.”6
However, in the years since its ratification, the BWC has not been updated or
given teeth, despite the increased threat of a biological weapons attack. This
leads to the following research question: Why is there a lack of political will to
update the Biological Weapons Convention?
Theoretical Paradigm
International Legal Realism is the theoretical paradigm that best frames the
research question and its potential answers. International Legal Realism assumes
that states wield power through rules and laws that govern behavior between
nations. This paradigm also assumes that change occurs on the international
stage when prompted by a state with relative power. The three main proponents
and founders of International Legal Realism are Hans Morgenthau, Harold
Lasswell, and Myres McDougal. Hans Morgenthau explains that international
laws need “to be seen within the sociological context of economic interests, so
cial tensions, and aspirations for power, which are the motivating forces in the
international field, and which give rise to the factual situations forming the raw
material for regulation by international law.”7 Relating to the core assumptions,
this standard for international laws explains that relative power is what controls
and drives outcomes on the international level. Similarly, Lasswell “defined
politics as the adversarial process of decision about the distribution of values
in society.”8 Furthermore, Lasswell and McDougal together “defined law as the
subset of the flow of decisions that could be said to be both ‘authoritative’ and
‘effective.’”9 Effective in this case is defined as controlling with power. Clearly,
from the definitions given by the three founders of the paradigm, relative
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power is crucial to interstate behavior and outcomes on the international stage.
These assumptions are the reason why International Legal Realism best
frames this research question and its answer. Lasswell and McDougal, in their
“Criteria For a Theory About Law,” state that “an emphasis explicitly focused
upon the institutions of the modern state […], unable to observe in the world
arena either appropriate centralized institutions or an identifiable monopoly of
force, has insoluble difficulty in accounting for the patterns of authority and
control transcending nation-state lines.”10 The BWC can certainly be classified
as an institution of the modern state, but more specifically, it lacks verifica
tion or centralization. Without teeth or hard international law, there can be
no concrete authority or enforcement on an issue such as biological weapons.
This aspect of the theoretical paradigm relates to the first case study, which
focuses on the Biological Weapons Convention Verification Protocol. The
paradigm also frames the threat inflation case study through its assumptions
about interaction between states and the role of power. Threat inflation in the
case of biological weapons reflects the more abstract concept that is the shift
to a unipolar international system. Lasswell and McDougal “emphasize that
law as an on-going process is located in a larger social context […] and legal
problems are generally attributable to the broader social setting,” described as
the big blooming ongoing confusion, “in which they always occur.”11 Finally,
as it applies to the final case study, the decline in arms control, International
Legal Realism explains that the state with the most power drives change. Change
in this final case study is a shift from arms control to nonproliferation, or the
prevention of the spread of weapons like biological weapons. The United States
set the precedent for other nations to adopt a defeatist policy when it comes
to biological weapons control. However, this assumption of International
Legal Realism also applies to the larger picture of the research question. “The
Lasswell-McDougal approach was designed to develop social policies through
careful and rigorously organized theoretical deliberation.”12 While a shift in
outlook on biological weapons can be standardized by the United States, the
10
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development of a solution to the BWC issue can as well.
Failure to Implement the Biological Weapons Convention
The Biological Weapons Convention’s failed Verification Protocol and other
similar attempts serve as empirical instances that represent a broader and more
abstract concept. In the exploration of a reason for lack of political will to
update the BWC, an important idea that often comes up is the concept of
sovereignty and the desire of states to keep their relative power unchecked.
The Verification Protocol and its failed ratification by the United States is an
excellent representation of this independent variable, which may be causing
a lack of political will among states to redo the BWC in a way that gives it
teeth, which the Verification Protocol would have accomplished. The BWC
was written and negotiated from 1969 to 1971, opened for signing in 1972,
and was ratified by 43 countries by the time that the United States ratified it
in 1975. The biological weapons treaty “prohibits the development, produc
tion, stockpiling or acquisition by other means or retention of microbial or
other biological agents, or toxins.”13 However, dating back to the creation of
the BWC, efforts to strengthen its policies and give it some force have been
fairly unsuccessful and, some say, even half-hearted. A couple of fairly obvious
barriers became apparent when the BWC entered its negotiation phase. One
such obstacle “lies in the dual-use nature of the materials, equipment, and
know-how fundamental to legitimate research laboratories and multinational
industries. Avenues to biological weapons cannot be completely closed off
without sacrificing the beneficial science […] that depend on these dual-use
items.”14 The more troublesome impediment is the effect that enforcement
would have on states’ sovereignty. From this obstacle stems a long history of
paradoxical statements and actions in the United States.
Even in the process of its negotiation, the BWC proved difficult for the two
world superpowers at the time—the United States and the Soviet Union—to
agree to under certain provisions that would leave them vulnerable to sover
eignty infringement. The dichotomy between support of the BWC and desire to
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maintain control over defense and military research and development surfaced
in the negotiation period of the convention. In a memorandum to President
Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger informed the President “we have supported
negotiation of a prohibition on biological weapons and toxins along the lines
of the 1969 UK draft convention.”15 Later in the same memorandum, Kissinger
implied that intrusive investigations into states’ activities involving biological
weapons programs should be avoided.16 According to Jonathan B. Tucker of
the Arms Control Association, “by the time the Cold War superpowers finished
reworking the BWC, they had dropped all formal verification provisions, […]
enabling Moscow and Washington to use their veto power to block inquiries
into their own activities or those of their allies.”17 Though a formal verification
protocol was yet to be established, the United States and Soviet Union both
clearly opposed intrusive investigations by the BWC even at the risk of crip
pling the convention.
In the first few years after the ratification of the BWC, “the participating
states tried to strengthen the convention by establishing several politically
binding confidence-building measures (CBMs), including annual declarations
of high-containment biological facilities designed for work with dangerous
microorganisms, and reports of unusual disease outbreaks.”18 However, the
lack of penalty for abiding by these CBMs led to a ridiculously low number of
states that upheld them. Similarly, “Article IV of the treaty requires member
states to pass domestic legislation that would penalize bioterrorists operating
within their borders by outlawing offensive biological weapons activities.”19 A
similarly low number of states adhered to this policy. Finally, “at the Third
BWC Review Conference, European countries sought a rigorous and intrusive
on-site inspection regime analogous to the one then being elaborated for the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).”20 In response, the United States
15
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along with Iran, Russia, and others opposed this proposed protocol due to its
potential infringement on these states’ ability to research biological defense.
“The American negotiating position on a verification protocol had been driven
by restrictions desired by the Department of Defense, […] apparently trying to
prevent the exposure of biodefense activities taking place in the United States.”21
Following the United States’ adamant refusal of on-site investigations, it became
clear that the BWC was going to deteriorate without any hard law to support it.
From this point on, a pattern among Presidents of the United States ap
peared in which their public statements on the BWC expressed clear support
and steadfast commitment to its strengthening, while their archival documents
revealed serious hesitation about allowing any form of verification that may give
teeth to the treaty. In a report to the National Security Council in 1970, the
Interdepartmental Political-Military Group asked, “Should the U.S. maintain
an option to develop capabilities to retaliate with toxins against chemical or
biological attack?”22 Presidents, advisors, and other officials have continually
asked this question throughout the years since the creation and ratification of
the BWC, and it seems that their actions answer in the affirmative. On February
16, 1995, President Bill Clinton sent a message to Congress saying, “The United
States was an active participant in the Special Conference of States Parties [and]
the Special Conference produced a mandate to establish an Ad Hoc Group
whose objective is to develop a legally binding instrument to strengthen the
effectiveness and improve the implementation of the BWC.”23 In actuality, the
Ad Hoc Group, also known as verification experts or VEREX, only encouraged
off-site surveillance that did little beyond create suspicion among party states.24
While President George W. Bush made a similar statement supporting the
strengthening of the BWC in November of 2001,25 in July of 2001, he “decided
Ibid.
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not to sign the protocol to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention by
providing monitoring and compliance provisions, citing the administration’s
doubts about the ability to verify compliance with the treaty and its concerns
about [its] impact.”26 Bush’s policy has bled over into the Obama administration,
which has done nothing to further the verification process of the BWC. It is
clear from this string of presidential decisions and statements that sovereignty
plays a large role in the lack of political will to update the Biological Weapons
Convention. With that said, other factors are also very influential in hindering
political will and action regarding the convention.
Threat Inflation of Bioterrorism
This second case study aims to represent the shift to a unipolar world in the
international system. The rise of the United States and the fall of the Soviet
Union after the Cold War brought about the shift from a bipolar to unipolar
world. As Detlev F. Vagts stated in his piece on Hegemonic International Law,
“America is in a position to reshape norms, alter expectations and create new
realities.”27 America’s unique position is due to its role as the hegemon on the
global stage. Yet, this ability also comes with responsibilities and, perhaps
more importantly, risks. As the political and military leader of the world, the
United States constantly runs the risk of being targeted or seen as being too
powerful. For this reason, the United States government must constantly be
concerned with the threat of attack while simultaneously working to avoid
a security dilemma, in which an adversary state becomes threatened by the
United States’ increase in military capabilities, and in turn, increases its own
capabilities, creating a cycle of paranoia and security expansion.
In regards to biological weapons, American citizens and officials alike see
the threat of bioterrorism as a menacing possibility. The intuitive assumption
regarding the connection between threat inflation and action to update the
BWC is that due to the expanded threat, the United States should be more
inclined to promote the restraint of biological weapons development elsewhere
in the world. It also seems quite possible that as a result of the threat, the United

26
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States would want to maintain its own biological capabilities. In an article on
arms control, Jack Beard explains, “a state actor is unlikely to forgo a particu
lar class of weapons permanently unless it receives assurances that adversary
states are reciprocally so committed and an effective monitoring regime is in
place to ensure against a ‘surprise defection,’ that is, cheating.”28 If this is the
case, then the threat inflation of bioterrorism certainly could be affecting the
lack of political will to update the BWC. Before that can be determined, it is
important to analyze the perceived threat.
First, the presidential archives show that the threat of biological weapons
has been a pressing matter since the development of such weapons. However,
over the years, presidents became increasingly worried and behaved more cau
tiously on the matter. President George Bush Sr. stated, “On November 16,
1990, in Executive Order No. 12735, I declared a national emergency under
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act […] to deal with the threat
to the national security and foreign policy of the United States caused by the
proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.”29 In November of 1993,
President Bill Clinton “extended the national emergency on the basis that
the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons [continued] to pose an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of
the United States.”30 At this point in time, the major terrorist attacks of 2001,
which include the anthrax attacks and September 11th attacks, had not yet
occurred. This implies that the threat was inflated before there was any real
tangible cause for concern.
More recently, in 2002, Defense Horizons published a piece explaining
that “the current state of U.S. knowledge tells us that: almost any potential
U.S. military adversary either has biological weapons or has a program to get
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them [, and] technology is changing rapidly and […] offering more state and
non-state actors the means to exploit biological processes for military ends.”31
Similarly, an article on biological warfare from The National Security Archive
from 2001 warns that terrorists may have access to even eradicated biological
agents, such as smallpox.32 In 2011, the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation stated, “We fully recognize that a
major biological attack on one of the world’s major cities could cause as much
death and economic and psychological damage as a nuclear attack.”33 From
this history of threat inflation, it is evident that the threat has at least remained
constant, if not increased, over time.
A good portion of this expanded threat comes from the uncertainty and
suspicion about the activities of other states. The National Security Council
released a document stating, “Distinguishing illicit intent within the expanse
of legitimate activity presents a unique challenge. It is quite possible that we
would not obtain specific warning of an imminent threat or impending attack
in time to stop it.”34 In reaction to this fear, the United States has taken more
aggressive strategies in the past. “Justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq
included the immediate threat posed by Iraq’s purportedly resurgent weapons
programs.”35 Of course, the United States cannot simply invade every nation
suspected of expanding their biological weapons programs. Unfortunately,
government officials do not see verification of the BWC as a potential solu
tion. A National Security Council official stated, “The [verification] protocol
does not stop the threat posed by the spread of biological weapons […] but
the protocol’s requirement that states declare facilities in which weapons are
made and permit them to be inspected does put our bio-defense activities
[…] at risk.”36 This statement clearly sums up the entirety of threat inflation’s
effect on lack of political will to redo the BWC. Without the ability to protect
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itself, the United States sees the risks as being too high to chance a last minute
withdrawal from a renewed and enforced Biological Weapons Convention by
an adversary state.
Decline in Arms Control
This third case study considers the concept of a paradigm shift between inter
national relations theorists and government officials, in which nonproliferation
replaces arms control. Arms control is considered a form of hard law, whereas
nonproliferation is considered a form of soft law, also known as a gentleman’s
agreement. This shift represents a type of defeatist attitude towards control of
state and non-state actors with access to biological weapons. Biological weapons
proliferation and the likelihood for their use has been deemed “too intractable”
to be easily fixed.37 The overall decline in arms control, and its replacement
with nonproliferation strategies, has affected the lack of political will to update
the BWC because strengthening the convention would be following a hard law
and thus, the arms control approach. Just as with threat inflation, evidence
of the decline of arms control is apparent in archival documents as well as
scholarly works.
In pieces written on and about the Verification Protocol, many references
were made to the effect that the protocol would utilize an arms control approach.
In September of 2000, Dr. Susan Koch of the Department of Defense stated,
“we do not believe that the Protocol being negotiated will be able to provide the
kind of effective verification that exists in other arms control treaties.”38 However,
the Verification Protocol would have used more of an arms control strategy than
has ever been applied regarding the BWC. Such a statement by the Secretary of
Defense seems to signal a turning point in the recent history of arms control
decline. More recently, “between 2007 and 2010, the Biological Weapons
Convention Work Program resumed its focus on biosafety and pathogen se
curity, national implementation and codes of conduct for scientists, and also
focused on disease surveillance capacity building and assistance in the event of a
suspicious outbreak or alleged use of BW.”39 Interestingly, the majority of these
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new goals for the BWC are domestic, and only “surveillance capacity building”
would have any effect on foreign states. In the new biosecurity strategy revealed
after the Seventh Review of the Biological Weapons Convention, the Obama
Administration “views the role of the government as supporting this organic,
bottom-up process by conducting outreach to raise awareness, promoting
dialogue among the various stakeholders, […] supporting community-based
approaches to identifying and addressing irresponsible conduct,” and essentially
establishing a new set of ethics around the issue.40 Again, there is a huge gap
between this new policy’s strategy and the arms control strategies of the Nixon
era, when biological weapons and research first affected national security.41
The decline in arms control that is evident from the recent history of records
and scholarly works certainly is affecting the lack of political will to update
the BWC. Even in the formation and negotiating of the BWC, there was a
clear lacking of hard law that would have allowed for nations like the United
States to enforce violations of the treaty. In addition to avoiding intrusive
development investigations, the United States and other world powers chose
to form the final draft of the BWC with “soft structure” as opposed to “hard
legally binding obligation.”42 States adhered to these weak policies even when
blatant violations occurred, such as the anthrax outbreak at a research facility
in Sverdlovsk, Russia in 1979.43 Seeing as no intervention or real arms control
was required by the BWC, the United States did nothing more than make a
statement on the matter. In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly
in 1982, President Ronald Reagan stated, “The Soviet Union and their allies
are violating the Geneva Protocol of 1925, related rules of international law,
and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.”44 Without the obligation to
intervene, the United States was able to take a much less costly route in “dealing”
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with the issue. For this reason, the decline in arms control is influencing political
will in regards to the Biological Weapons Convention. If states like the United
States have a choice to do nothing, thereby saving resources, time, money, and
protecting their sovereignty, they would have no reason to attempt to change
this reality.
On the other hand, some theorists argue that soft law can be just as effec
tive as hard law in negotiating and deterring states. In the case of biological
weapons, this means that nonproliferation should, in theory, be as effective as
arms control. As is evident by past violations of the BWC, this is not the case.
“In spite of the many proponents and purported advantages of soft law in other
contexts, its indeterminate dimension appears to be a dangerous choice for a
design element in multilateral disarmament regimes, particularly when member
states face acute security dilemmas and effective transparency measures are not
available.”45
While this is playing out to be true, the United States government continues
to follow this policy of anti-arms control. Brad Roberts and Michael Moodie
of Defense Horizons stated, “When deterrence strategies prove unreliable in
dissuading a U.S. adversary from preparing or conducting BW attacks on
its forces or interests, the focus of U.S. efforts must shift to prevention.”46 It
seems as though hard law and arms control are a thing of the past, specifically
in relation to biological weapons. In its place, soft law and talk of prevention
and influence aim to get the job done.
Implications
There is no doubt that political will is seriously lacking on the issue of biological
weapons and the Biological Weapons Convention. However, it is not without
reason. The United States, along with the other world powers at this moment in
history, have a few prominent obstacles to overcome before any serious changes
can be made to foreign policy. The research discussed demonstrates that avoid
ance of verification measures, threat inflation of bioterrorism, and the decline
in arms control strategy are affecting political will on this topic. Something
must change for the safety of not only the United States, but also the nations
of the world. With swiftly advancing technologies in the biotechnological field,
45
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the threat of biological warfare, while inflated, remains serious and frightening.
The prospect of a biological attack on any nation is a horrifying and fearsome
image that must be prevented from turning into a reality. Unfortunately, without
compromise by powerful nations on the international stage, bioterrorism and
interstate attacks could become an actuality.
In order to overcome these obstacles, powerful states will need to set a
precedent for the rest of the international community. While The Independent
variables examined are evident and do affect political will on the issue of bio
logical weapons and the BWC, there are ways of influencing and overcoming
them for the greater good of the world. For example, desire for full sovereignty
and for maximization of capabilities must be decreased in order to give the
BWC some form of validation and enforcement. This means that nations like
the United States will need to take risks and forgo some of their sovereignty for
the safety of the global population. In regards to threat inflation, the United
States will probably remain hegemonic in a unipolar international system for the
foreseeable future. However, by cooperating and compromising with other world
powers, the United States can diminish the perceived threat of bioterrorism
and biological attacks to a reasonable level, allowing for the further develop
ment and strengthening of the BWC. Finally, the United States must return
to an arms control strategy. It is clear from recent efforts and policy changes
that soft law alone cannot change and restrain the dangers that threaten the
international stage and its actors. A combination of nonproliferation and arms
control could potentially reduce the threat. Since the emergence of biological
weapons as a viable form of warfare and weaponry, technologies have changed
rapidly and so, too, should the laws used to restrain them.
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